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AUGUSTINE AND THE EARLY CHURCH
Although there were early disagreements over the right
understanding of original sin and its consequences, a consensus gradu-
ally emerged in the Western Church as the outcome of the debates
between St. Augustine and the followers of Pelagius early in the fifth
century. Pelagius's disciple Celestius was condemned for the view that
Adam's sin affected only Adam, not the entire human race. Other
Pelagians (or semi-Pelagians) reasonably inferred that "If sin is natu-
ral, it is not voluntary; if it is voluntary, it is not inborn. These two
definitions are as mutally contrary as are necessity and [free] will."1
Since the Pelagians insisted on the voluntary character of sin, it
seemed to them impossible that one might be born with sin. Au-
gustine, on the other hand, affirms that original sin is both voluntary
and free for Adam, while it is natural and necessary for us. In part this
view stems from Augustine's efforts to safeguard the practice of infant
i. See Augustine Contra secundam Juliani responsionem opus imperfectum 1.78 (PL
45:1002) and 4.93 (PL 45:1303), quoted by Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition:
A History of Development and Doctrine, vol. 1: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition
(100-600) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 313.
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baptism in the Church, which certainly makes sense if there is some
inherited sin of which infants must be cleansed. In part it stems from
his reading of one Vulgate version of Romans 5.12, which identifies
Adam as the one through whom sin and death have entered the
world, the one in whom all have sinned.2 Because all humanity has
participated in the sin of the first man, Augustine avers, all human^
kind constitutes now a massa perditionis or a massa damnata,3 a single
lump of sin,4 a lump of filth.5
Augustine insists that every person participates in and inherits
Adam's sin and its consequences but is not very clear about precisely
how this sin is transmitted to subsequent generations or to the whole
of human nature. Augustine had often been asked to explain the
origin of the soul and the transmission of original sin. In reply, he
eliminates the views of the Pythagoreans and the Origenists, who
claim that the soul fell from heaven and entered a body as a punish'
ment for previous sins.6 He refutes also the Stoics, Manichaeans, and
Priscillianists, who argue that the soul is an emanation from the divine
substance. Finally, he attacks Tertullian's view that the individual
soul is produced from a material seed or rootstock (tradux) of the
parent. But Augustine himself is unable to decide between two re^
maining options: creationism and spiritual traducianism.7 Creation^
ism, a view Augustine attributes to Jerome,8 maintains that God
creates ex nihilo each new individual soul and infuses it in the body
2. Augustine Epistle 177Λl (PL 33:769). On the influence of Rom. 5.12 on the
development of the doctrine of original sin, see S. Lyonnet, "Le peche originel et le
exegese de Rom., 5, 12-14," in Recherches de science religieuse 44 (1956): 63-84.
3. Augustine Enchiridion 27.
4. Augustine De άiversis quaest. ad Simpl 1.2.16.
5. Augustine De diversis quaest. ad Simpl 83.68.3.
6. See especially R. J. O'Connell, "The Origin of the Soul in St. Augustine's
Letter 143," Revue des etudes augμstiniennes 28 (1982): 239-52. For a good survey of
views in the patristic era on the origin of the soul—and their later influence—see
J. M. da Cruz Pontes, "Le probleme de Γorigine de Γame de la patristique a la solution
thomiste," Recherches de thέologie ancienne et medievale 31 (1964): 175-229.
7. On these two views, see especially A. Michel, "Traducianisme," Dicύonnaire de
thέologie catholique 15:1351—1366. For a general discussion of original sin, creationism,
and traducianism in the early Church, see ]. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines,
5th ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 174-183, 344-374.
8. Augustine Epistle 166.3.8 (PL 33:723). Whether this is actually Jerome's view is
unclear. See Gerard O'Daly, Augustine's Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth,
1987), p. 19.
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generated from sexual intercourse. This infusion occurs either at the
moment of conception or forty days later, in the womb. Spiritual
traducianism maintains that the individual soul is generated from a
parent soul or spiritual principle: "As light is kindled from light and
from it a second flame comes into existence without loss to the first, so
a soul comes into existence in a child from the soul of the parent, or is
transferred to the child."9 Both positions, Augustine maintains, can
be defended by an appeal to the canonical scriptures.
In a letter addressed to Jerome, Augustine reveals his uncertainty,
but seems to follow Jerome's preference for the creationist solution.10
Still, Augustine elsewhere confesses that so long as we are agreed that
all suffer from original sin and require God's grace in order to be freed
from this sin and its consequences, the question of the origin of the
soul and the transmission of original sin can remain undecided with-
out danger. "Someone once fell into a well where the water was deep
enough to hold him up so that he did not drown, but not deep enough
to choke him so that he could not speak. A bystander came over when
he saw him and asked sympathetically: Ήow did you fall in?' He
answered: Tlease find some way of getting me out and never mind
how I fell in. '" 1 1 So it is not as important to know how we fell into the
well of sin as it is to find the way out.
Later Christian tradition, at least until the thirteenth century,
reflected Augustine's uncertainty when reviewing the creationist and
traducianist alternatives. Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville, Pru-
dentius,12 Cassiodorus, Rabanus Maurus,13 Agobard of Lyon,14 and
9. Augustine Epistle 190.15 (PL 33:862): "Tamquam lucerna de lucerna accen-
datur et sine detrimento alterius alter inde ignis existat, sic anima de anima parentis
fiat in prole, vel traducatur in prolem."
10. Augustine Epistle 166.8.26 (PL 33:731).
11. Augustine Epistle 167.1.2 (PL 33:733): "Cum quidem ruisset in puteum, ubi
aqua tanta erat, ut eum magis exciperet ne moreretur, quam sufϊocaret ne loqueretur;
accessit alius, et eo viso admirans ait: Quomodo hue cecidisti? At tile: Obsecro,
inquit, cogita quomodo hinc me liberes; non quomodo hue ceciderim, queras." For
this translation, I have relied on Augustine's Letters, vol. 4 (letters 165-203), trans-
lated by Wilfrid Parsons, The Fathers of the Church 12 (New York, 1955), p. 33.
12. Prudentius Carmen Apotheosis 780-990.
13. Tractatus de anima 2 (PL 110:1112C). Rabanus Maurus does not share Au-
gustine's hesitancy but declares himself strongly in favor of creationism. See also his
Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini 3.3.
14. Liber contra objectiones Fredegisi abbatis 14 (PL 104:168).
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others generally preferred the creationist solution but often hesitated
to condemn traducianism altogether.15 In the eleventh century,
Odorannus of Sens defended creationism, after reviewing the views
of Gregory, Prudentius, and Isidore.16 He was joined by Werner of
St. Blaise.17 In the twelfth century, Hugh de Ribemont took up the
defense of creationism.18 In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
traducianism began to appear not only as a less probable solution but
also as false, impious, and, ultimately, heretical one. This change
appeared in Peter Lombard,19 Thomas Aquinas,20 Robert Pullen,21
and others. Finally, the Fifth Lateran Council, under Pope Leo X,
defined as Catholic doctrine the infusion of a soul—created from
nothing—to each new body.22
THE ELEVENTH' AND
TWELFTH-CENTURY DEBATE
It is especially in the eleventh and twelfth centuries that
one finds new interest expressed in the origin of the soul and the
transmission of original sin. The reasons behind this new interest are
difficult to determine. Perhaps popular religious movements during
the eleventh century, which contemporary critics associated with
Manichaeanism,23 revive the emanationist theory of the souΓs origin,
a view that Augustine had condemned in his own century. Perhaps
renewed encounters with a Neoplatonic explanation of the origin of
15. For additional citations, see especially Michel, "Traducianisme," pp. 1355-
1358.
16. Ad Everardum monachum, de tribus quaestionibus 4, in Opera omniay edited by
Robert-Henri Bautier et al. (Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scien-
tifique, 1972), pp. 134-151.
17. Deflorationes SS. Patrum 2: De origine animae (PL 157:1161-1162).
18. EpistolaadG. Andegavensem (PL 166:833-836).
19. Sententiae 18.8, 31.2.
20. For a discussion, see Jean-Marie Dubois, "Transmission et remission du peche
originel: Genese de la reflexion theologique de saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue des
etudes augustiniennes 29 (1983): 283-311.
21. Sententiarum Ubή octo 2.8 (PL 186:731A).
22. See Michel, "Traducianisme," p. 1358.
23. For example, Adhemar of Chabannes. For a translation of some of the relevant
texts, see especially R. I. Moore, Birth of Popular Heresy (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1976), pp. 9-10, 93-94.
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the soul, conveyed to the twelfth century especially by Macrobius,
contribute as well to this new interest.24 Perhaps the appearance of a
nominalist challenge to Christian Platonism can explain the resur-
gence of debate.25 Perhaps encounters with the Jewish community in
northern Europe encourage it; or, perhaps the development of the
quaestio from the lectio in the schools may help explain the new efforts
directed toward a systematic examination of the problem of original
sin.2 6 Whatever the causes, there is a new willingness among Chris-
tian theologians to appeal to philosophy in order to examine this
question, together with a confidence that dialectic could treat it with
some success.
Anselm is perhaps the best-known example of an orthodox dialecti-
cian from the late eleventh century. He discusses the reception and
consequences of original sin in his De conceptu virginali et originali
peccato.27 In the process, he employs a philosophical vocabulary that
will become common in these discussions—a vocabulary that distin-
guishes nature from person, and natural sin from personal sin. He fails
to decide between the virtues of traducianism or creationism, how-
24. Macrobius defends the view that there is single World-Soul that is the source
of all other souls. See his Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis 1.6.20, edited by Jacob
Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970). for complaints against those who have received the
Platonic doctrine from Macrobius in the late eleventh century, see Manegold of
Lautenbach, Contra Wolfelmum Coloniensem, edited by Wilfried Hartmann, MGH
Quellen 8 (Weimar: 1972), pp. 1-2. For a study of Manegold's work, see Wilfried
Hartmann, "Manegold von Lautenbach und die Anfange der Fruhscholastik,"
Deutsches Archiv fur Erforschung des Mittelalters 26 (1970): 47-149.
25. See especially Joseph Reiners, Der Nominalismus in der Frύhscholastik> BGPM 8
(Miinster, 1910). This work includes the Latin text of the letters of Abelard and
Roscelin. For Roscelin of Compiegne, see Francois Pica vet, Roscelin: Philosophe et
thέobgίen (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1911).
26. Jewish medieval philosophers also accepted the view that God infuses the soul
into the body at the moment of creation. See, for example, Saadia Gaon, Booh of
Opinions and Beliefs, treatise 6. Still the doctrine of the souΓs preexistence persists in
aggadic literature. See Louis Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, translated by Henrietta
Szold, 7 vols. (Philadelphia: 1938-1946), 1:56. On the development of the quaestio,
see especially Bernardo C. Bazan, "Les questions disputees, prίncipalement dans les
facultes de theologie," in Les questions disputέes et les questions quodlibέtiques dans les
facultέs de thέohgie, de droit et de mέdecine, edited by Leopold Genicot, Typologie des
sources du moyen age occidental 44-45 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), pp. 21-40.
27. See especially De conceptu virginali 23.
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ever. This failure evidently disturbed him for the rest of his life.
Eadmer, in his Vita Anselmi, notes that when Anselm was awaiting
death, he hoped at the end to have a little more time in this world so
that he might solve the problem of the origin of the soul, which he
had been turning over and over in his mind and which he feared no
one after him would solve.28
Whether Anselm's ultimate solution would have supported crea^
tionism or traducianism is difficult to settle. His works leave an im-
pression of uncertainty.29 Any determination in favor of creationism
is complicated by the fact that his student, Gilbert Crispin, supported
the traducianist position. It is often assumed that Gilbert was repre-
senting his master's view.30 By contrast, the creationist view seems to
have been defended by the school of Laon, to judge from some frag-
ments treating original sin that are sometimes attributed to Anselm of
Laon.31 The most complete eleventh-century treatment of these ques-
tions, however, which discusses both traducianist and creationist al-
ternatives, comes not from Laon or Bee but from Tournai. In a
little-known work, De peccato originali, Odo of Tournai presents the
first theological treatise written expressly on original sin since Augus-
tine. 3 2 This work represents, then, an important part of a long theo-
logical struggle that was moving to define the origin of the soul and
the transmission of original sin.
28. Eadmer, The Life of St. Anselm, edited by R. W. Southern (London: T.
Nelson, 1962), p. 142: "Et quidem si voluntas ejus in hoc est. voluntati ejus libens
parebo. Verum si [Deus] mallet me adhuc inter vos saltern tarn diu manere, donee
quaestionem quam de origine animae mente revolvo absolvere possem. gratanter
acciperem, eo quod nescio utrum aliquis earn me defuncto sit soluturus."
29. For a discussion, see Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972), pp. 206-210.
30. Gilbert Crispin's De Anima, found in British Library MS Add. 8166, if. 37-39,
has recently been published in The Works of Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster,
edited by Anna Sapir Abulafia and G. R. Evans (London: Oxford University Press,
1989), pp. 157-164. For his apparent defense of traducianism, see especially De
Anima 16, p. 159.
31. For a translation of some of these, see A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to
Ockham, edited by Eugene R. Fairweather (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956),
pp. 261-266.
32. For this claim, see also da Cruz Pontes, "Le probleme de Γorigine de i'ame,"
p. 191.
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ODO OF TOURNAI
AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE
Since it is often assumed that toward the end of his life
Odo abandoned philosophy after he entered a monastery, it may be
useful to provide a few biographical details in order to establish the
position that his De peccato originali enjoys in his literary corpus. Odo
was born about the middle of the eleventh century. During the 1080s
he became a popular master at the cathedral school of Notre Dame at
Tournai.33 There Odo's reputation as a dialectician and master of the
liberal arts attracted students from Flanders, Normandy, Saxony, Bur-
gundy, and Italy.34 Unfortunately, Odo's earliest, and perhaps most
philosophical, works—Sophistem; Liber complexionum; and De re et
ente—have not survived.
Odo's extant works must be dated from after his conversion to the
religious life—a conversion precipitated by a reading of Augustine's
De libero arbitrio. His biographer, Herman, explains that Odo was
overcome with grief when, attempting to explicate the fourth book of
Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy for his students, "he came to read
the third book [of De libero arbitrio] in which the aforementioned
Doctor [Augustine] compares sinful souls to a slave struck down from
his prior dignity for his crimes and [compares these souls] to the filth of
this world, who have lost celestial glory for their crimes."35 Almost
immediately, Odo took a small group of disciples, departed the cathe-
dral school of Notre Dame, and established an eremitic community at
the abandoned abbey of St. Martin of Tournai in 1092.36 Odo became
the first abbot of this new foundation. He ended his life (d. 1113) as
bishop of Cambrai.
Before this abrupt renunciation of the life of the secular scholar,
33. On the cathedral chapter, see Jacques Pycke, Le chapitre cathedral Notre-Dame
de Tournai de la fin du Xle ά la fin du XΠe siecle, Universite de Louvain: Recueil de
travaux d'histoire et de philologie 6/30 (Brussels, 1986).
34. Herman Liber de restauratione monasterii sancti Martini Tornacensis 1, MGH
Scriptores 14 (reprint, 1963), p. 274-
35. Herman Liber de restauratione 4, p. 276: "Cum ecce legendo ad tercium librum
pervenitur, in quo prefatus doctor servo criminibus suis de priori dignitate pulso et
mundande cloace deputato comparat peccatrices animas, que celestem quidem
gloriam pro sceleribus suis perdunt."
36. See my "Odo of Tournai and Peter Damian: Poverty and Crisis in the Eleventh
Century," Revue Bέnέdictine 98 (1988): 125-152.
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Herman remarks that Odo had taken more pleasure in the works of
Plato than the writings of the Fathers. Boethius's Consolation of Phi-
losophy was only one text that communicated to the Middle Ages
Platonic doctrines of participation and the hierarchy of being. Odo
may have owed his understanding of universals to this text. His philo-
sophical realism distinguished him from more innovative masters in
the eleventh and early twelfth centuries—such as Roscelin of Com-
piegne and Raimbert of Lille—who began treating universals as a
mere flatum υocis.37 Yet Odo did not shrink from defending his view.
Odo's commitment to a realist doctrine of universals is visible in his
principal work, De peccato originali.38 It was written sometime between
1095 and 1110.39 Even the earlier date, however, establishes that this
work was written after Odo had abandoned the cathedral school at
Tournai for the monastery in Tournai that had been rededicated to St.
Martin. Odo may have left the school, but he did not leave behind his
interest in philosophical questions.
Odo's text may thus have been written before or after Anselm's De
conceptu virginali et originali peccato, composed between the summer of
1099 and the summer of 1100.40 Both authors share the view that
original sin is the result of the loss of original justice that Adam
enjoyed.41 Moreover, Odo shares Anselm's understanding of adequate
37. For Odo's competitive relationship with Raimbert of Lille, see Herman's Liber
de restauratione 2, p. 275. This portion of Herman's text, which discusses school
debates on universals at Tournai and Lille, is reproduced in Pica vet's Roscelin, Appen-
dix. For a good discussion of the twelfth-century debates on universals, see John
Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150): An Introduction (London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 131-139.
38. See Maurice de Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, translated by Ernest C.
Messenger (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1926), 1:108.
39. Julius Gross suggests the latest date for Odo's work, although without providing
any evidence to support his claim. See his Geschichte des Erbsundendogmas 3: Ent-
wicklungsgeschichte des Erbsundendogmas im Zeitalter der Scholastik (12.-15. Jahrhundert)
(Basel and Munich: Ernst Reinhart Verlag, 1971), p. 28.
40. For the dating of Anselm's work, see Anselm of Canterbury, edited and trans-
lated by Jasper Hopkins (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1974-1976), 3:259, n.l .
Most historians assume that Odo was dependent, in some sense, upon Anselm's work.
But they fail to demonstrate any real relationship between the two. See Odon Lottin,
Psychologie et morale aux XΠe et XHIe siecles (Louvain: Abbaye du Mont Cesar, 1954),
4:167-168.
41. For Anselm's discussion of original justice and original sin, see especially De
conceptu virginali et oήgίnali peccato 1-2. For a good discussion, see A. Michel, "Justice
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satisfaction, found in Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, which identifies the
satisfaction of the God^man as necessary to remove the stain of origi-
nal sin.42 It is not so clear, however, that Odo and Anselm agree on
the most probable philosophical solution to the problem of the trans-
mission of original sin, especially if we accept Gilbert Crispin's appar-
ent traducianism as Anselm's own. Odo displays a preference for the
creationist solution, although not without recognizing the advantages
offered by traducianism.43
What distinguishes Odo's work on original sin is the effort to set out
and consider according to philosophical principles the two most prob-
able options—traducianism and creationism—in order to discover the
truth about them. He defends his philosophizing as a pedagogical
device, confessing that he does not philosophize in order to demon-
strate the truth of faith but only in order to teach that truth more
effectively. The philosophical discipline assists the teacher of truth,
he claims, inasmuch as many clerks in his church are trained in the
liberal arts and will be convinced more quickly and easily through
them.4 4 At the same time, however, he recognizes a broader mandate
for philosophy. Truth, he claims, is something so weighty and difficult
that even the learned man has trouble discovering it. But the learned
man is one who seeks the reasons (rationes) for things, so that the
originelle," Dictionnaire de thέologie catholique 8:2020-2042. Grabman describes
Odo as a member of Anselm's school of thought, at least in his teaching on original
sin. See Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1956), 2:156. Fairweather repeats this claim in his Scholastic Mis*
cellany, p. 58. For Odo's definition of original justice, see Depeccato originali (PL 160:
1075-1076).
42. For Odo's treatment of the Incarnation and Atonement, see his Disputatio
contra Judaeum Leonem nomine de adventu Christi filii Dei (PL 160:1101-1112).
43. See E. Amann, "Odo de Cambrai," Dictionnaire de thέologie catholique 11:933—
934. For extensive discussion of Odo's De peccato originali, see F. Labis, "Le
bienheureux Odon, eveque de Cambrai," Revue catholique 8 (1856): 453-460, 519-
585; and Blaise Haureau, Histoire de la philosophie scolastique (Paris: Durand et Pedone-
Lauriel, 1872), 1:296-309.
44. De peccato originali 3 (PL 160:1102C): "Philosophicas considerationes quod
posuimus, ne precor, arguant fratres quasi catholicam fidem munire voluerim per
philosophicam rationem. Non feci ut munirem, sed ut docerem. . . . Ideoque philo-
sophica quaedam adhibuimus, quia novimus de clero Catholicos, liberalibus eruditos
artibus, videre clausa citius per ea quae noverant."
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hiddenness of truth will be disclosed and mysteries revealed.45 With
Anselm, then, Odo seems to move from faith to understanding by
seeking the necessary reasons for things.46
ODO OF TOURNAΓS DE PECCATO ORIGINALI
An edition of Odo's text is found in Migne's Patrologia
Latina (PL 160:1071-1102). This edition is based on the older Maxima
Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum.47 Although no critical edition of the text is
available, I have compared these printed editions with one another and
with a twelfth-century manuscript, Douai Bibl. mun. 201 (fol. 92-
112), and find them reliable and reasonably free of corruption.
Odo's treatise is divided into three books. In the first book, he
attacks the Manichaean conceptions of evil as a real nature or essence
and of sin as a positive defect. Evil, he explains, is only a privation of
good, while sin is the privation or absence of justice in the will of the
rational soul.
The soul is created good by God. Injustice enters when the soul
fails to preserve and guard the gift of original justice that God con-
ferred upon the first human being as a natural or preternatural gift. Al-
though we give names to various evils—injustice, impiety, darkness,
blindness—these names do not signify real existents. If these priva-
tions can be ordered by the mind under genus and species, they cannot
be subsumed under the most general genus, being itself. Properly -
speaking these evils have no essence, no species or genus. Their order
and the names they bear are borrowed from real existents—injustice
from justice, impiety from piety, and so on. The mind, Odo explains,
can only contemplate nonexistents by borrowing forms (formas) from
existing things. So too language can only refer to nonexistents by
borrowing the names of things that really exist, "for speech follows
45- De peccato originali 3 (PL 160:1102C): "Sed veritas ponderosa est et
gravis . . . quam vix eruditus invenit. Ideo sunt undequaque rationes quaerendae, ut
aperiatur occulta non ut muniatur fortissima; ut detegatur clausa mysteriis, non ut
roboretur immutabilis."
46. Labis describes Odo's logical exposition as "un des plus beaux specimens de
considerationes rationelles sur les dogmes catholiques que presente la theologie
scolastique" (see his "Le bienheureaux Odon," p. 519).
47. Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum, edited by Maguerin de la Bigne, 27 vols.
(Cologne, 1577), 21:227-241.
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thought, so that language has not established words other than as
thought orders images."48
Similarly, the art of the painter can only represent nonexistent or
fantastic things by employing the forms of things that are. But the
forms of evil then are not derived in the customary way—i.e., by a
process whereby mind 'selects' and forms figures (figurae) of real
things. Rather, they are assumed or borrowed according to their like^
ness to real essences. Consequently, one cannot say that evil or in^
justice is 'in' a subject in the same way that knowledge-of'grammar,
for example, is 'in' Socrates. When we say injustice is 'in' Adam, we
mean rather that the positive essence, justice, is no longer 'in' Adam.
Justice is a species under the genus, the Good. While all things are
good, as Boethius taught, so far as they exist, not all are just.49 The
essence of justice is not 'in' all things, not even all good things.
Moreover, justice is properly predicated only of rational agents. Thus,
when one says that the human being is unjust, one expresses a priva^
tion rather than a simple negation, because justice is lacking where it
ought to be. Sin is not the presence of a positive defect in human
nature so much as it is the absence of the positive gift of original
justice, which Adam ought to have preserved along with his nature.
Once Odo has explained that the 'nature' of sin is injustice, he
moves in book 2 to consider how that shadow nature is transmitted
from Adam to subsequent generations. Essential to his discussion is
Paul's claim that 'in' Adam all human beings have sinned. One con-
cern, then, is to explain in what sense all human beings are 'in' Adam
and how Adam's sin can be communicated to others.
Odo acknowledges that in a genetic sense all human beings are 'in'
Adam, who is a material cause.50 Just as my body is contained in the
seed of my father, his body is contained in the seed of his father, and
so on, even to the first parent of the human race. All can thus be said
to descend from Adam according to the flesh. This theory helps to
48. De peccato origmali 1 (PL 160:1076D): "Nam sermo sequitur cogitationem, ut
non aliter digerat lingua sermones quam cogitatio dictat imagines."
49. See Boethius's Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint
substanύalia bona, edited by E. K. Rand in Boethius: The Theobgical Tractates (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1918); reprint ed. (1962), pp. 38-50.
50. Anselm argues as well that all of us exist in Adam materially through Adam's
seed, according to our nature although not according to our person. See his De
conceptu virginali 23.
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explain how certain family resemblances or physical characteristics
pass from one generation to the next.5 1 It would be simple enough to
aver that Adam's sin passes from parent to child with the material seed
during the process of procreation. But Odo rejects this claim, just as
Augustine had, inasmuch as Adam's sin is located in the soul—more
specifically, in the will—and not in the flesh. Merely the instrument
of a sinful soul, the body is of itself capable of neither good nor evil.
Still, procreation provided a powerful model from ordinary expert
ence in order to explain both the sense in which all are 'in' Adam and
the way in which sin is transmitted from Adam to later generations.
The spiritual traducianists argued by analogy that just as my body is
'in' Adam and descends from his, so too my soul is 'in' Adam and
descends from his along with the seed of the flesh. There are a number
of advantages to this view. Just as certain physical resemblances in
later generations could be explained according to the genetic model,
whereby the body of the child is produced by the separation of the seed
from the body of the parent, so too certain moral or psychological
dispositions could be explained by the hypothesis that the soul of each
child is contained virtually or in some other way in the soul of the
parent and, ultimately, in that of the first parent. Adam's sin deprived
his soul of original justice. His descendants receive their souls from his
concomitant with the seed that flows from him. Their souls thus
display the same lack or privation that Adam contracted, as well as
the same inclination toward sin, which is concupiscence.
Despite the advantage traducianism offered, Odo identifies crea-
tionism not merely as equally likely (which Augustine was often in-
clined to do) but as the orthodox view,52 although he does not cite a
single orthodox defender of this position. He remarks, "the orthodox
say that the human soul in no wise descends from a soul, but that new
ones are made daily by God for new bodies."53 His willingness to
identify creationism as the orthodox view makes it certain that Odo
will not oppose this position, unless one wishes to attribute to Odo an
uncharacteristic and dangerous irony.54
51. De peccato oήginali 3 (PL 160:1098-1099).
52. De peccato σriginali 2 (PL 16O:1O77B).
53. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1078B): "Dicunt ergo orthodoxi humanam ani-
mam ab animo nullo modo descendere, sed in recentibus novas a Deo corporibus fieri
quotidie."
54. The claim that Odo clearly perceives the theological difficulties inherent in
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Although Odo will defend creationism, he recognizes all too well
that certain difficulties arise with the orthodox view. The most power-
ful objection arises from reason: "If I have only the body from Adam,
and the soul truly is not from Adam but from God alone, and since sin
is only in the soul and not in the body, then how can I say that I have
sinned in Adam?"55 Creationism, then, might lead to either one of
two unacceptable conclusions: (1) We do not sin 'in' Adam, and
therefore do not suffer the guilt of original sin. (2) Since God creates
new souls ex nihilo that are defective, lacking the justice they ought to
have, God is the author of their sin or evil.
Odo perceived that the first conclusion led to Pelagianism, the
second to Manichaeanism. It is all the more surprising that he vig-
orously defends creationism. Although creationism does allow Odo to
defend the notion that God is the proximate efficient cause of every
soul in a way that God is not for every body, this is not the focus of his
work. Rather, the effort to understand the orthodox view provides the
occasion for a detailed exposition of Odo's metaphysics. This exposi-
tion will conclude that God does, in one sense, create defective or
deprived souls ex nihilo, but it insists that Adam is responsible for the
defect. It also concludes, however, that the embodied soul that God
creates is modeled after that unchanging human nature or species that
is 'in' Adam. The soul, then, is created anew, but also from a 'root' or
antecedently existing species, even if it is not transmitted directly
from this root species but through some third thing (such as semen).56
traducianism and defends creationism is widely accepted. See, for example, A. Auger,
Etude sur les mystiques des pays-has au moyen dge, in Mέmoires couronnέs et autre
mέmoires publiέs par Vacadέmie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts Belgique 40
(1892): 70; Gross, Entwicklungsgeschichte des Erbsύndendogmas, p. 31; Tullio Gregory,
Platonismo medievale (Rome: Istituto storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1958), pp. 47-
50; Amann, Ό d o du Cambrai," p. 934; and Michel, "Traducianisme," p. 1355.
While Odo perceived that traducianism had certain advantages, it seems that Fred-
erick Copleston was mistaken when he insisted that "what Odo of Tournai main-
tained was a form of traducianism" (see his A History of Philosophy 2: Mediaeval
Philosophy from Augustine to Scotus [New York: The Newman Press, 1971], p. 141).
Copleston merely repeated here the opinion he first expressed in Medieval Philosophy
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1952), p. 36.
55. De peccato oήginali 2 (PL 160:1078C): "Nam si solum corpus ab Adam habeo,
animam vero non ab Adam, sed a solo Deo, cum peccatum in anima tantum sit, et
non in corpore, quomodo dicor in Adam pecasse?"
56. De peccato oήginali 2 (PL 160:1085C-1087A).
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It is not new in an absolute sense. Thus, both alternatives—creation-
ism and traducianism—appear in Odo's discussion. It reflects tradu-
cianism because God creates our souls after an existing nature; it
reflects creationism because these later souls are not created from
Adam's individual soul.
If this solution is to have any merit, Odo must first explain how
Adam's individual sin could possibly affect the species-nature that we
all share. Only then can he absolve God of all guilt for having created
souls ex nihilo that yet carry the defect of the privation of original
justice. A large portion of his text, then, is given over to a discussion
of the manner in which Adam's sin could affect the human nature
itself.
It is the orthodox view, Odo contends, that the whole and entire
human species was 'in' Adam at creation. Though an individual man
distinguished by the addition of various accidents, Adam nevertheless
constituted the entire human species. The species had only a single
member.
Although it is the proper nature of the species that it is common to
many, per accidens it may have but a single member. Odo provides
other examples of species having only one member: the phoenix, the
world. There is a phoenix nature, but only one phoenix. What can be
said of the individual phoenix can also be said of the phoenix nature
or species. Similarly, there is only one world, so that what can be said
of this world can also be said of world as species-nature. Moreover,
there is a phoenix nature, and a world nature, and a human nature—
in the case of these single-member classes—because there is an indi-
vidual; at the same time, there is an individual phoenix because there
is a phoenix nature. The existing species-nature and an individual
imply one another. There cannot, for Odo, be a species without any
individual or particular instantiation of the species-nature. Yet even
in the case of the species-nature that has a single member, species and
individual are not logically identical. Each has its own peculiar prop-
erties. The species, by definition, can be predicated of many even if
per accidens it has but one member. The individual, however, cannot.
The relationship between the individual and the species-nature in
the instances mentioned above is, for Odo, rather different than it is
for species having many individuals. In the cases above, apart from
those logical properties that pertain to the species per se (e.g., that it
can be predicated of many), the individual is closely identified with
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the universal. In other cases, the individual is merely a part of the
whole nature, as a point is only a part of a line. In some cases, the
individual is clearly distinct from the species, as an individual dog
reveals only a 'part' of the dog nature. As a result, for a species having
many members, the accidents of the individual distance it from the
species-nature. In these cases, it is not true that whatever is said of a
single individual can also be said of the species. Rather, only what can
be said of all individual dogs—that is, what they have in common—
can be predicated of the species.
While it is possible for the species to have but a single member, this
is not true, Odo insists, for the genus. There can be no genus having a
single species for the simple reason that the species is the genus with a
substantial difference added. If there were a genus with a single spe-
cies, species and genus would collapse into one another. If the genus
"animal" had the single species "rational animal," then all animals
would be rational. Consequently, genus and species would be both
logically and ontologically indistinguishable. There is, however, a
genus "animal" that subsumes the species "rational animal" and "irra-
tional animal," and the two species differ substantially from the genus.
While the species must differ substantially from the genus, the
individual does not differ substantially, but only accidentally, from its
species-nature. Thus, the individual human being can be identified
with the species in a way in which the single species cannot be identi-
fied with the genus.
Although philosophical considerations lead Odo to distinguish spe-
cies and genus in this way, there seems also to be an underlying
theological interest. For him, Adam is 'in' the species (and the species
nature is 'in' Adam) in a way in which he is not 'in' the genus.
Moreover, the properties of the individual are communicated to the
species—as in the case of the species with only one member—in a
way in which they are not communicated to the genus, which must
have at least two species under it. Odo intends that Adam's loss of
original justice is communicated to the species, but not to the genus.
Consequently, as we shall see, it is appropriate to speak of a sin of
human nature even while that sin is not attributed to the entire genus
"animal."
Despite the special character of the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the species in the case of the species that has per accidens
only a single member, Odo is careful to distinguish the two. Other-
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wise, one might be tempted to add that whenever the individual
changes, the species also changes. But one must still introduce a
distinction. Species have their own properties by which they differ
from individuals. For species are, in themselves, unchangeable, in-
composite, and incorruptible, while individuals do change, are com-
posite, and, ultimately, will die. The species, by its very nature, is
universal and can be said of many. The individual, on the other hand,
is singular and not universal,57 and it is constituted as or in its sub-
stance by its accidents.58 Some accidents and properties of individ-
uals, however, can be predicated of the universal in a secondary sense,
even though they are not 'in' the universal in the same way that they
are 'in' individuals.59 In particular, the species possesses those charac-
teristics through which it differs from other universals because there is
an individual that possesses them. Because there is some individual
man, Peter, the human species has that property (rationality) that
distinguishes it from the genus.60
These properties can be shared in some way through the substantial
union of the individual and the species, in a manner analogous to the
way in which the attributes of the soul affect the body when the soul is
infused in the body or, conversely, as the passions and needs of the
body affect the soul. Odo explains that the individual human being is
actually a composite of many substances or forms (multiplex substantia).
Unlike the Godhead, in whose single substance subsist three persons,
the human person is a rational individual composed of several sub-
stances.61 But 'person' is properly said only of the rational soul and not
of the body alone. Although a composite of many substances, the
human being is a person first and foremost through the human soul.
Yet when the soul is joined to a body, the properties of the soul are
communicated to the body in much the same way that the properties
of the divine person are communicated to the human nature assumed
57. De peccato oήginali 2 (PL 160:1079B): "Individuum non nisi de uno dici potest.
Species etiamsi de uno solo dicitur, universalis est; individuum vero nonnisi singulare
est."
58. De peccato oήginali 2 (PL 160:1079B).
59. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1082B-C).
60. Cf. De peccato oήginali 2 (PL 160:1083B): "Id autem quo species ab univer-
salibus differt non habet nisi in individuo, et sic habet in individuo quasi non sit aliud
quam ipsum individuum, cum tamen species sit et non individuum."
61. De peccato oήginali 3 (PL 160:1088B).
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in the Incarnation,62 In both cases there is a communicatio idiomatumy
a sharing of properties.
In another way, as each form comes to constitute the human sub-
stance in the individual, each shares its specific nature with the
whole. So, for example, one may call someone just, when properly
speaking justice only belongs to his or her soul or rational nature.
Similarly, one says that someone is black, when properly speaking it is
only his or her body that is black. Just as seemingly incompatible
attributes can be predicated of the God-man, so, too, seemingly in-
compatible attributes can be predicated of the human person as a
result of this communication of properties. Insofar as the human per-
son is a singular subject, it is indivisible; insofar as it is a whole and a
composite, it can be divided.63 Insofar as the soul is immortal, so too
is the body, just as the corruptibility of the body can be communicated
to the soul.64
As with this communication of properties between body and soul or
singular and composite, there is a communication of properties be-
tween individual and species or common nature. On Odo's account,
this communication is never whole or entire. There will always re-
main certain properties that are proper to the individual or the species
alone, which properties distinguish them. Otherwise the individual
and the species would perfectly coincide, which is not the case even
for the species having a single member. For the first human being as
well, soul is joined to body to constitute a (composite) human individ-
ual. But the species or universal itself is not material, and it is by its
nature incomposite.
Yet the privation of original justice can be shared by the individual
person and the species-nature. In original sin, it is the soul of Adam—
his human soul—that has sinned. The human species has not sinned
qua species, however, but only in the individual, namely Adam (and
Eve). What Odo will attempt to demonstrate is this: that as the
species-nature (rational animal) possesses its substantial difference of
rationality only because there is a rational individual, so the species-
62. De peccato oήginali 3 (PL 160:1087D-1088A).
63. De peccato oήginali 3 (PL 160:1088A).
64. Augustine also notes that although the soul is immortal, it is not immortal in
the sense that God is immortal, for the soul is corruptible whereas God is incorrupt-
ible. Cf. Epistle 166.3.
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nature can lose its property of original justice when there is no individ-
ual possessing this property.
PERSONAL SIN AND NATURAL SIN
When the human species was first created, Odo ex-
plains, the human soul was 'divided' in two persons, Adam and Eve,
yet it remained whole and entire. The human soul per se, the species-
nature (specialis natura), is distinct from the soul in Adam and the soul
in Eve.65 Yet this same human soul or substance is common to both
Adam and Eve. It is a unique property of the species to be common to
many. Moreover, the specie^ or common nature existed in no other
individuals than these two.
Each of the two persons fell into sin at the suggestion of the ser-
pent. More: each fell into the same sin. Because there were no other
human persons, and because they committed the same sin, in each of
them the species-nature (natura specialis) was stained by sin. But if
every individual human person has fallen into the same sin, then the
whole human nature has contracted the same sin:
Therefore in the soul of Adam and in the soul of Eve, who have sinned
personally, the whole nature of the human soul is stained by sin; that
substance which is common, is special for each. For beyond these two it
does not yet have being. If it had been divided among others, the whole
would not have been corrupted by these two alone. Because if these had
sinned, perhaps some others would not have sinned, in whom the nature
of the human soul would be undamaged. Now then where could a sinless
human soul be which was everywhere a sinner?66
The actions of Adam and Eve, then, affected human nature, the
natura specialis. Although they are two individuals, scripture often
treats them as one, explains Odo, by referring to them according to
65. De peccato σήgiruili 2 (PL 160:1079D).
66. De peccato origίnali 2 (PL 160:108ID-1082A): "In peccatricibus ergo personis
est infecta peccato natura specialis, quae non est alibi quam in ipsis. In anima Adae
ergo in anima Evae, quae personaliter peccaverunt, infecta est peccato tota natura
humanae animae; quae communis substantia est, est specialis utriusque. Extra has
enim nondum est earn esse. Si enim fuisset in aliis divisa, pro ipsis solis non inficeretur
tota. Quia si peccassent istae, forsitan non peccassent aliae, in quibus esset salva
humanae animae natura. Nunc autem ubi poterat anima humana munda esse quae
peccatrix erat ubique?"
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one name, Adam. It does this in order to indicate that they are both
guilty of the same sin, and that it has passed to human nature itself.
Therefore, although Adam and Eve are two, they may be treated in
this sense as a single individual, and what happens to the "one"
happens to the whole. Their special situation is comparable to that of
the phoenix, the world, or any other species having a single member.
This is, for Odo, a distinctive case: "Only when a species is said of a
single individual is one able to speak of the accident of the species just
as much as of the individual, although principally and in the first place
there are accidents only in individuals."67
Odo acknowledges the objections of critics, who insist that it is
absurd to say that the species has sinned. "Universals always are what
they are," they object, "and, however individuals may change, univer-
sals endure immutably, and although mutability may be predicated of
them through individuals, still it is not in them."68 Odo agrees that
the species does not sin in itself but in its persons. Still in much the
same way that the accidents of the single individual of the species are
shared or communicated with the universal, and the qualities of the
part can be predicated of the whole, so too the sin of all individuals
together is communicated to the universal. As the property of original
justice is one that belongs to the species and is communicated to the
individual soul, so the loss of original justice among all human persons
is communicated to the species. If original justice is no longer found in
human individuals, then it cannot be said either to be shared or
common to many, therefore it is no longer 'in' the universal. "There-
fore," he concludes, "a person does not have sin without his species,
since it has to be one and the same with it substantially, and there is in
the first man a sin of nature personally, and yet not naturally. Because
principally sin is in the person who has sinned, and secondarily in the
species which has sinned. "69
67. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1079C): "Et quando de solo species dicitur
individuo, tantumdem accidens dicere et de individuo valet et de species quamvis
principaliter et primo loco sint in individuis accidentia."
68. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1082B): "Sed forte dicet aliquis . . . universalia
semper sunt quod sunt, et, utcumque varientur individua, consistunt immutabiliter
universalia, et quamvis de ipsis vere dicatur mutabilitas individuorum, non est tamen
in ipsis."
69. De peccato originali 2 (PL 160:1083C): "Non habet ergo persona peccatum sine
sua specie, cum qua unum et idem habet esse substantiate, et est in primo homine
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Because of this communication of accidents, the human soul,
which is whole and entire in Adam and Eve, is guilty of sin, and other
human persons, born in the natural way, cannot be created without
that sin. Every person coming after Adam's personal sin, then, is
naturally sinful.70 An understanding of original sin leads Odo to assert
that he has sinned as a human being, but not as Odo; as a substance,
although not as a person.71
Again, just as something can be said of the whole on account of the
part, so too some things can be predicated of the universal on account
of the individual. Consequently, even though the soul is only a 'part'
of the human being, Adam's-sin affected not only his soul but the
entire human species-nature, body and soul.72
This certainly constitutes a change of some sort in human nature.
But for Odo it does not represent an essential change in what the
human being is so much as a change in what the human being has.
Humankind no longer has original justice, and therefore God cannot
justly create human souls possessing original justice after the fall. It
may perhaps best be described as a change of relation: the relationship
between Adam (and therefore humanity as such) and God has
changed insofar as Adam failed to offer God God's due. A change of
"relation" does not result in a change in the substance.
While this explanation does not solve the problem of the origin of
the soul—Odo will attempt to do that at some length in other chap-
ters in his work—it does establish a separation between the individual
soul of Adam and the natura specialis, even as it provides for the
communication of change in the individual to the nature. The change
remains, even after Adam is gone. Creating the individual soul ac-
cording to the same "form" or "nature" in Adam, God does create
"new" souls suffering from a privation of original justice, but does so
under a just necessity. While new as individual persons, they are
personale peccatum naturae, non naturale. Quia peccatum principaliter est in persona
quae peccavit quidem, secundo loco in specie quae peccavit quidem . . . "
70. De peccato σriginali 2 (PL 160:1084A). Note that Odo does not hold that Adam
alone is a human person who sinned, and not Eve, when he claims that the whole soul
is in Adam. He is merely following the authority of scripture: "Ut igitur secundam
Scripturae loquamur auctoritatem, quae primae conditionis duas personas accipit pro
una et uno nomine vocat eas, id est Adam" (De peccato oήginali 2 [PL 160:1083B]).
71. De peccato oήginaίi 2 (PL 160:1085B-C).
72. De peccato originali 3 (PL 160:1088C).
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created according to the preexisting species: "Therefore, God makes a
new soul which does not have a new nature. It is then new in the same
nature, and not new. In the person it is new, in the species it is not
new. It is new in personal property, but not new in its common prop-
erty."73 This paradoxical formulation reflects the tension through-
out Odo's work between creationism and traducianism. While Odo
vigorously defends creationism, the tension is never resolved. His
effort to defend the orthodox theological position demands more than
his philosophical skills can provide. But his detailed discussion of
genus, species, individual, universal, and person in order to solve a
theological difficulty reflects a renewed interest in the instruments of
philosophy and identifies Odo as a significant philosophical writer of
the early twelfth-century renaissance.
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73. De peccato σήginali 3 (PL 160:1091 A): "Facit ergo Deus animam novam, quae
naturam non habet novam. Est ergo eadem natura nova, et non nova. In persona
nova est, in specie nova non est. Nova est proprietate personali, non nova proprietate
communi."
